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Chapter 16 
The Aesthetic Politics of Environment 
 
Introduction1 
It is one of the wonders of philosophy that an idea should persist despite all possible 
evidence for abandoning it.  Of the many ideas to which this comment can apply, the one that 
is most pertinent here is the belief, widespread in the Western tradition, of the autonomy of 
art.  The reasons for this are understandable.  Many factors connected with art suggest that 
much of its force and value lie in the relative independence of making and appreciating art.  
The creative impulse is always unbridled and unpredictable, and often it is coupled with the 
healthy influence of deliberate iconoclasm.  Less obvious is the directness of aesthetic 
engagement in appreciation and its opportunity for original experience.  But independence is 
different from autonomy, and claims for absolute autonomy in art as in social life may be 
wishful but are ungrounded.   
The historical course of the aesthetic and the artistic does not support the idea that the 
artistic enterprise is or should be wholly self-directed.  On the contrary, the social history of 
the arts demonstrates their responsiveness to forces in the human world.  Whether as subject-
matter, referent, incentive, or motive, the larger and all-inclusive social world is immanent in 
                                                          
1 This essay develops the final chapter in my recent book, Sensibility and Sense:  The Aesthetic Transformation of the Human World 
(Exeter, UK:  Imprint Academic, 2010).  I acknowledge with appreciation the similitude of my title and subject to Jacques 
Rancière’s Le partage du sensible; esthétique et politique, although the inquiry here is independent of his.  I also want to 
acknowledge with gratitude the valuable assistance of Yuriko Saito and Riva Berleant in refining this essay. 
 
 
art in diverse and often unpredictable ways.2  And, conversely, aesthetic perception, which lies 
at the heart of art, is immanent and pervasive in the human world.  Exposing the many 
strands and layers of the influence of the aesthetic reveals as much about human sociality as it 
does about art.   
Illuminating the pervasiveness and importance of the aesthetic presence was the task 
of my recent book, Sensibility and Sense:  The Aesthetic Transformation of the Human World.3   This 
essay carries that process still further, particularly into the regions of political theory.   It aims 
to show that the energies of the aesthetic process invariably encompass and engage the social 
world, and that the implications of artistic practice and aesthetic experience are necessarily 
political.  Let us consider how  thoroughly interwoven are the social, the political, and the 
aesthetic. 
Aesthetic perception 
Aesthetic theory, it has often been observed, rests on perception, and aesthetic 
appreciation has its locus in sensory perception.  Nothing in human experience is pure, simple, 
or direct.  There is no simple sensation, no pure sensory perception, no experience of any kind 
that is not thick with associations, meanings, structures, and feelings.  Aesthetic inquiry begins 
in such a condition.  Its perennial challenge to that inquiry, as in philosophy and indeed in all 
query, lies in recognizing the initial complexity of perception and responding to its demands as 
                                                          
2  These considerations say nothing about historical and social factors, such as the aesthetic movement, art pour l’art, and other 
expressions of romantic ideology. 





we work to increase our knowledge and deepen our understanding.   The philosophic 
centrality of perception is what gives aesthetics its wider importance, for aesthetics stands at 
the origin of the philosophic process and remains central to that process.  It is not simple or 
easy to peer through the conceptual miasma that blankets perceptual experience.  For as I 
have noted, perception is never wholly private but is encased in multiple associations, 
structures, and assumptions through which it is shaped, directed, and interpreted.   
A stunning revelation emerges as we begin to recognize the forces that inform such 
experience, and realize that these influences have profound political implications.  It means, in 
fact, that there is no clear beginning:  no pure sensation, no initial axiom, no original 
condition, no sensus communis.  Nor can we begin with consciousness, with radical subjectivity, 
phenomenology notwithstanding.  In fact, we must recognize the presumption rather than the 
priority of subjectivity, that storm anchor of the Western philosophical tradition.   
Subjectivism, moreover, is not only a misleading idea and a dangerous illusion; it is 
also an obstacle to a transformative politics.  Few commentators have been able to liberate 
themselves from its tenacious grip,4 and this inability functions to impede and perhaps even 
prevent the founding of a true politics of freedom.  For freedom, as it is commonly 
understood in the West, is bound up with the related tradition of individualism, yet the 
assumptions underlying individualism can also be placed in serious question.  But how else 
can we proceed?  How else can we conceive of freedom, of the political sphere, of the human 
world, if not in terms of subjectivity and individualism?  This is where aesthetics can make a 
critical contribution. 
                                                          
4  Subjectivism is one of the most pervasive and powerful intellectual forces in modern Western thought, resembling here 
Cartesian dualism to which it is related, and its influence is almost equally ineradicable. 
 
 
In its root meaning as sense perception, aesthetics, when pursued by setting aside 
cognitive meaning and pre-judgment, establishes a kind of radical phenomenology.  
Perception is never pure, never somatically direct, as William James pointed out,5 for we 
invariably edit and add to sensation.6  In addition to its traditional concern with cognitive 
processes, one of philosophy’s unending tasks is to identify, articulate, and examine the 
grounds and significance of pre-cognitive processes and, perhaps we might add, post-cognitive 
ones, as well. This examination is exceedingly difficult since the very influences that 
philosophic inquiry seeks to expose are at work clouding and obstructing that very effort.  
These processes are well disguised behind multiple structures designed to hide or render them 
palatable, from the euphemisms of linguistic fig leaves to self-gratifying, pseudo-scientific 
cosmologies that are usually religious or ideological in origin.  Burke saw the danger with 
admirable clarity:  “When we go but one step beyond the immediately sensible qualities of 
things, we go out of our depth.  All we do after, is but a faint struggle, that shews we are in an 
element which does not belong to us.”7   
Influences on perception  
Leaving the natural attitude, adopting the classic precondition of phenomenological 
description, is just one of philosophy’s primary steps.  To suspend the assumption of 
existence only begins Salome’s dance by discarding the outermost of the many interpretive 
                                                          
5  “[T]he general law of perception, which is this:  that whilst part of what we perceive comes through our senses from the object before us, 
another part  (and it may be the larger part) always comes out of our own mind.”   William James, Psychology  (Holt,1892), p.  329.   
6  See Part One, especially Chapter Four. 
7  Edmund Burke, Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) (Oxford:  Oxford University 




layers that veil sense perception.  Indeed, the source of much of the continuing freshness and 
vitality of the arts lies in their uninhibited reliance on pre-cognitive perception, a vitality that 
persists despite every effort to capture and constrain art by external controls and reductive 
explanations.  Let us consider some of what we now understand about the multifarious 
influences on sense perception.8 
We well know (with all the qualifications that must be assigned to any knowledge 
claim) that social influences and compulsions affect our apprehension of the very data of 
sensory perception.  Social psychologists have amassed a large body of experimental evidence 
that documents the effects of such influence.9  Of special relevance here is the continuing 
work in the sociology of knowledge that began in the 1920s and ‘30s, work that presents a 
powerful challenge to the presumed objectivity and independence of truth.  This research 
shows clearly how our understanding of reality is socially constructed, and that “whatever 
                                                          
8 Ben-Ami Scharfstein, Ineffability:  The Failure of Words in Philosophy and Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1993). 
9  Among the classical experiments are Asch’s studies on the influence of social pressure on visual perception and Hastorf and 
Cantril’s study of the influence of motives on group perception.  Studying the perception by the onlookers of a contentious 
football game, Hastorf and Cantril concluded that "out of all the occurrences going on in the environment, a person selects 
those that have some significance for him from his own egocentric position in the total matrix."  The event they studied 
"actually was many different games" and the varying accounts observers gave of what took place were equally real to them.  
The study found that people’s perceptions were influenced by what they wanted to see.   The researchers concluded, "In 
brief, the data here indicate that there is no such 'thing' as a 'game' existing 'out there' in its own right which people merely 
'observe.' The game 'exists' for a person and is experienced by him only insofar as certain happenings have significances in 





passes for ‘knowledge’ in a society…is developed, transmitted and maintained in social 
situations,” forming the reality that is generally taken as the standard.10  Indeed, the very 
foundation of what is distinctively human in perception lies in its character as a socially and 
historically achieved activity that is constantly changing.  This character, whether it be 
informed by a religious, scientific, or any other world view, invests perception with cognitive, 
affective, and teleological characteristics that exemplify it as a social and not merely a 
biological or neurophysiological activity.  What is more, perception is not the action of a 
specific sense-modality, such as sight or hearing, or of the perceptual system alone but an 
activity of the whole organism.  Heidegger himself recognized the powerful influence of 
cultural tradition.  "All philosophical discussion, even the most radical attempt to begin all 
over again, is pervaded by traditional concepts and thus by traditional horizons and traditional 
angles of approach."11   
In recent decades deconstruction has emerged as a methodology of critical analysis 
that exposes underlying assumptions and raises basic questions about cognitive knowledge.  
Taking this critical stance without adopting a preconceived limit or predetermined end leads 
                                                          
10  Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, 
New York:  Doubleday, 1966), p. 3.  This book provides an excellent account of the field. Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology (1954) (Bloomington, IN:  Indiana University Press, 1975),  p. 22.   
Arnold Berleant, "On Judging Scenic Beauty," in Aesthetic Culture: Essays in Honour of Yrjö Sepänmaa, ed. S. Knuuttila, E. 
Sevänen, and R. Turunen ( Maahenki Co:  2007), endnote 5, p. 74 (revised and included in this book as “Reconsidering Scenic 
Beauty”).  Also see Marx Wartofsky, "Perception, Representation, and the Forms of Action:  Towards an Historical 
Epistemology”  (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science,  1985).  




to permanent yet productive incompleteness.  We might even extend the scope of 
indeterminacy by recognizing in the body of theoretical and practical knowledge provided by 
the sciences the unavoidable but qualifying influence of the experimenter on every 
investigation.  What well may be emerging here is a notion of human knowledge vastly 
different from the ideals of objectivity, certitude, and completeness that have stood as the 
standard from classical times to the twentieth century.   
This is not intended as a digression into an epistemological study, but it is necessary 
for our critical purposes to acknowledge these factors as the ground for any discussion of 
fundamentals and beginnings and not to elevate consuetude beyond its proper measure.  This 
acknowledgment does not psychologize or sociologize philosophy.  It is essential, however, to 
recognize that philosophy is not and has never been an entirely independent inquiry.   
Philosophy’s claim of primacy is specious if it does not take into account the psychological 
and social conditions that affect all inquiry, its own included.  The attempt to find a true 
beginning in consciousness, whether perceptual or cognitive, cannot be sustained.  However, 
we need not wait for neuropsychology to explain what constitutes consciousness:  brain 
functions may generate organic events but they do not dissolve or replace their manifestations.  
Consciousness may be a question but it is not an answer. 
Considerable illumination comes from the work of anthropologists, sociologists, and 
other behavioral scientists who have demonstrated in detail the formation of conscious 
thought through the human interactions by which cultural, linguistic, historical, and cognitive 
structures and ideas are shaped and absorbed.  The body of evidence these sciences have 
accrued is overwhelming.  What is needed is to acknowledge that evidence and incorporate its 
implications into our philosophical deliberations.  Putting aside traditions and doctrines 
 
 
ignorant of such knowledge is the pre-condition of fresh and liberating understanding.  
However, acknowledging such influences on the knowledge process is hardly the final truth 
either, for we cannot legislate future inquiry.  Its value lies in enabling us to dispense with 
inherited doctrines that cannot endure the light of present knowledge.   
Art as revelatory 
These observations are particularly germane to our experience of the arts in part 
because of their revelatory power, their capability of vision that is direct and penetrating.  For 
this reason, appreciating the arts demands open receptivity, and this openness is perceptual.  
The arts work through complex sensory modalities.  Painting, for example, is not exclusively 
visual.  It has tactile overtones that come from the qualities of the surfaces represented, as well 
as from the brushwork of the pictorial surface itself, which varies with the artist’s technique 
and often takes on greater importance in abstract art.  In representational art, tactility emerges 
in the virtual “feel” of the depicted surface:  the glaze of a vase, the coarseness of a plastered 
wall, the roughness of the cobbles of a street.  Pictorial experience also incorporates the 
viewer’s physical responsiveness in body stance, muscle tension, and spatial awareness.  
Painting is unavoidably multi-sensory. 
As we consider our experience of art, it is necessary to recognize that the arts differ 
from each other in significant ways, including their sensory range.  No art, as must now be 
clear, relies exclusively on a single sense.  What is true of pictorial experience is equally true of 
other art experience.  Music and dance performances bring together theatrical and somatic 
factors in the physical presence of both performer and audience, in the body awareness of 
space and place, and in the empathetic participation in the execution.  The range and manner 
of sensory participation obviously varies with the art and with individual performances  and 
 
 
audiences, but it is always multi-modal.  Perceptual engagement is especially broad and 
complex in environmental experience, and synaesthesia may be the most accurate description 
of sensory involvement here.  The perception of landscape, for example, is never exclusively 
visual but employs somatic, kinesthetic, and haptic sensibilities, all of them fused with sight 
and sound.  In addition, It is essential to avoid assuming one specific art as paradigmatic, as is 
often done with painting, taking the measure all the others against the structural and material 
features of pictorial art.   
An aesthetic politics 
If the arts and perception more generally are socially embedded and informed, to what 
kind of politics can an aesthetics of perception lead?  Much of the history of Western political 
thought is mired in myths, and some of the most persistent of these purport to describe the 
origin of the human community.  Indeed, origins are one of the favored subjects of myth, and 
the seventeenth-century fiction of the state of nature incorporated many of the common 
explanatory features of such myths.  I call this idea a fiction because it is an entirely 
conjectural construction.  It offers a presumably rational explanation of the formation of 
community out of a loose, inchoate collection of people who may, in a correlative myth, 
contract with one another to establish political order.  The presumptive conditions under 
which they make this social contract vary with the version, such as the classic ones proposed 
by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau or, more recently, by Rawls’s notion of the “original 
position.”  And just as varied are the political orders that they are used to justify, from 
absolute monarchy to liberal democracy.  
One can understand the appeal to the Age of Reason of so rational a reconstruction of 
society, but this merely adds a second myth to the first, the myth of a social contract to that of 
 
 
a state of nature.  And it is the product of its own social history, providing a fictitious account 
that panders to our present age where the narrow calculation of self-interest reigns 
dogmatically and results in a wider unreason that produces global dislocation, exploitation, 
and conflict.  Still, in spite of the absence of any paleoanthropological evidence to support it, 
the myth of a pre-social condition persists. 
A philosophical process guided by aesthetics can help identify and expose the multiple 
layers of assumptions, constructions, axiomatic presuppositions, and cultural beliefs that 
obscure sense perception so thickly.  Salome’s dance continues.  Still, we can ask whether the 
landscape of an aesthetic politics begins to appear through the haze.  Do we discern there the 
polis as the model of an aesthetic polity?  With all its historical limitations and moral failings, 
the polis was, for a brief time in ancient Greece, actual.  Much of its appeal lies in the fact that 
the polis joined community with law and a participatory, self-determining socio-political 
process in which, for those who were citizens (a huge limitation), there was no alienation from 
the state.  Is such an ideal still useful as an achievable goal of human community?12  
The perceptual commons 
Where else can we turn for an aesthetic politics?  A suggestive direction lies in the 
notion of a perceptual commons, the ground of all perceptual experience.13  Because the 
grounds of perception are necessarily, immediately, and universally present and accessible, 
they have a common claim.  One does not have to establish a “right” to the air we breathe or 
to unimpeded movement and unpolluted space.  All these are appropriated without challenge 
                                                          
12   Maryvonne Saison, in “The People Are Missing,” Contemporary Aesthetics, Vol. 6 (2008), pursues with great sensitivity the 
idea of an aesthetic sociability in the thought of Deleuze, Foucault and others. 
13 See Sensibility and Sense, pp. 208-212. 
 
 
in the activity of sustaining life.  The presence of life constitutes its own claim.  We can also 
make perceptual claims:  to the viewscape as publicly accessible, to quiet public space, for air 
and water that are pure and healthful and not altered or controlled for others’ convenience or 
profit; in short, for environment that promotes life and well-being.   
Such a commons is grounded in perception, and perception emerges from the 
persistent fact of life itself.  All these derive from what Kant called “the right to the earth’s 
surface that belongs in common to the totality of men….”14  However, I call these claims, not 
rights.  The concept of rights is leads to complexities of argument that entail problems of 
circularity, and the idea is itself a political construct, if not another political myth.  A claim, on 
the other hand, is a simple assertion evidenced in behavior and grounded on the conditions 
necessary for life.  While there is no limit to claims that can be made, what distinguishes 
perceptual claims is their immediacy in experience and their primacy for sustaining life itself.   
The “original” commons is a material commons in which land and other natural 
resources belong to no one but are held by everyone, as in Locke’s account of the origin of 
property.15  Similarly, the perceptual commons is  a social, indeed a human planetary resource, 
and it is implicated by being available and accessible where life is present.  These commons do 
not have recourse to a “state of nature;” their claim does not rely on a constructed, fictional 
history.  The commons rests ultimately on what we may call the perceptual condition, a 
situation that does not begin with a prior agreement or a complex arrangement but with 
simple presence.  And it rests equally on the biological condition.  No one has to prove his or 
her ”right” to air for breathing, and a person’s living presence is the sole justification needed 
                                                          
14  Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace (1795), trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett, 2003), p.16. 
15  Commons do exist and have existed historically in actual societies. 
 
 
for exercising that claim.  Such claims lead to the claim to satisfy other vital requirements:  to 
water, to protection from the weather, to food, to safety.  These organic conditions lead 
seamlessly to social ones needed to secure them.  This has significant implications for claims 
to social services and benefits, but this cannot be developed here.  It is enough for our present 
purposes to offer the idea of perceptual claims to the most basic life-sustaining resources.16 
What does the idea of a perceptual commons contribute to an aesthetic politics?   
There is much here to be discovered, for the perceptual commons is a germinal idea that can 
grow in many directions.  It can contribute to dispelling the mists of myth that obscure the 
direct force of experience; our thought is thickly clouded by such myths.  Still more important, 
the concept of a perceptual commons provides a basis for commonality and the nurturing 
support it can provide, and for welfare to replace conflict as the dominant social 
preoccupation. 
Many features of a positive politics are implicit in the idea of a perceptual commons.  
The presence of such a commons entitles everyone to participate equally in its enhancements 
and possibilities.  Entitlement without access is empty, and therefore conditions must be 
present that enable everyone to make free and full use of the commons.  Enabling, however, 
is not sufficient in itself, for people have not only to be informed and allowed but induced to 
participate.  Therefore, the availability of the commons and an appreciation of its significance 
need also to be promoted.  From this commons there emerges, not the familiar ethics of 
penury, but an ethics of profusion.  Starting with the whole, the whole of natural resources, 
the whole of perceptual possibilities, we can generate an ethics of care, not conflict; of justice, 




not privilege.  It might be said that perceptual equality precedes and underwrites political 
equality. 
To emphasize the aesthetic in experience is to engage in openness, connectedness, 
cooperation, and to allow vulnerability.  Ken-ichi Sasaki observes that “When it was coming 
into existence, aesthetics was charged with the real and urgent philosophical problem of its 
time:  how to construct a new world.”17  This remains its continuing charge in the face of what 
stands as a perennial problem of the anti-social.  Perhaps emancipation from a tradition of 
negative mythologies (such as a “state of nature” with limited resources) and from the 
practices of negative sociality (self-interest as the basis of society) will make it possible for a 
                                                          
15  There is no simple analogy between the material commons and the perceptual commons.  The difficulties usually detected 
in the first usually rest on the prediction that self-interested users will exploit  material resources for their private benefit but 
with overall consequences that result in the depletion or destruction of those resources, the so-called “tragedy of the 
commons.”  Arguments condemning the material commons as impractical or impossible rest on assumptions about self-
interest presumed to be ”human nature” but which is actually cultural nature and cultural behavior.  Further, they fail to 
recognize the determining influences of cultural traditions and training in sociality that can and do succeed in maintaining 
material commons.   
 Such questions and presumed difficulties do not affect the perceptual commons for obvious reasons.  The organic 
limits on consumption deter their overuse (one can breathe only a limited quantity of air), while space and air pollutants, such 
as smoke particles, industrial and “entertainment” sounds, noxious odors, and the like, are intrusive by their very presence, 
while enjoying their absence knows no bounds.  It is enough to note here that, while ultimately related in the unity of human 
being and the human world, these commons are distinguishable and entail different issues.  Thus their arguments are 
independent of each other. 
17  Ken-ichi Sasaki,  “The Politics of Beauty,” Contemporary Aesthetics, 9 (2011).  See also Salim Kemal, “Nietzsche’s Genealogy 
– Of Beauty and Community,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 21/3 (October 1990), 234-49.  Reprinted in 
Nietzsche’s “On the Genealogy of Morals,” critical essays ed. Christa Davis Acampora (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 
 
 
new aesthetics to provide a source from which new patterns can develop and fresh models 
emerge that we can pursue in the quest for positive culture.18 
The task of constructing the outlines of a new world is, I believe, the most urgent 
philosophical challenge of our time, and this challenge can best be undertaken by starting with 
the aesthetic.  But why the aesthetic?  Because the aesthetic offers the means for clear, 
unclouded vision.  But aesthetics, while foundational, is not sufficient and, as far as a 
philosophic contribution is concerned, we must include the major domains of philosophic 
thought:  ontology and metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, social and political philosophy, but 
all guided by an aesthetics of perception.  It is necessary to cast the range of inquiry broadly in 
order to establish its proper context.  But the prior task remains of clearing the terrain of 
many of the conceptual and structural obstacles that confound our thought and occlude our 
understanding, difficulties for many of which philosophy is particularly responsible.  Here a 
radical aesthetics can be a powerful tool:  it can illuminate and liberate our grasp of a world 
that carries our indelible mark. 
Such a vision brings us to the need for recognizing and shaping environment.  It may 
be that the perceptual commons identifies the establishing conditions of the human 
environment, that is, of the human world, and that in shaping environment we are enhancing 
                                                          
18  It is not in the spirit of these remarks but nonetheless necessary to acknowledge that any and all of these features of a 
positive aesthetics can easily be subverted and turned into instruments of oppression, as human history documents so 
eloquently.  But my purpose is not to safeguard aesthetics from sadistic misuses.  There will always be those whose ingenuity 
can devise ways to drag the banner of human ideals in the mud.  If humans ever develop a civilized culture, such perverse 




and making coherent all its participating constituents.  How this perceptual landscape is 
designed, appropriated, and populated concerns everyone, and it allows many possibilities, 
both aesthetic and political.  We cannot help but be affected by the brash and exploitative 
appropriations of this commons in the political, military, industrial, and commercial co-
optations of the perceptual conditions of human life.  Here the aesthetic and the moral merge 
inseparably.   
The co-optation of sensibility 
The human environment is nothing if not perceptual.19  It is in and through perception 
that human life is sustained, indeed, that it becomes possible.  This understanding of aesthetic 
perception has powerful moral implications.  We have recognized that life has a claim on the 
means to sustain it and, because this claim antecedes every other, it takes priority.  A newborn 
does not have to prove its claim to the breath of life:  it inhales to take in air without motive, 
without thought, as a purely somatic response to its new conditions.  So in like manner we 
must recognize the human claim to the means for supporting life.20  I think it is necessary to 
go still further and include, as inseparable from organic functioning, needs usually identified as 
emotional, psychological, social, and even, yes, aesthetic.  As integral beings, such life 
requirements are fused in the full functioning of human being.   
All these are organic, existential, human claims on the perceptual commons, on the 
conditions that make life possible and fulfilling.  Such needs do not have to be proved; they 
do not have to be justified.  That is why they are simply claims.  And because they are 
                                                          
19 This is not to endorse subjective idealism but to recognize that the human experience of environment rests on perception. 




inherently perceptual, they are also aesthetic.  One does not have to make a legal case for pure, 
unpolluted air.  Activities that pollute the atmosphere in a locality threaten the life-processes 
of those who live there.  Such practices are not only unaesthetic but immoral.  And if the 
argument be made that a sunset seen through the haze of pollution is more beautiful than 
otherwise, this may be so only for the distant observer.  Those who must inhabit the haze 
view it otherwise.  A parallel case can be made for sound pollution, such as the intrusion of 
canned music, engine noise, and loud conversation in public space, whether it be in the 
supermarket, the restaurant, or the city street.  The argument for activities that produce 
environmental pollution has a specious plausibility that comes only from asserting a so-called 
right to do as one wishes without considering its effect on others, and by detaching the 
aesthetic from the rest of human concerns.  The moral and the aesthetic are often symbiotic 
and, in a world of continuities, nothing is entirely insulated from any part of the whole.   
Landscape pollution provides another example.  The claim can be made that a healthy 
environment includes the experience of both visual and physical space.  Intrusions into that 
space must be justified on grounds that they promote health, safety, and well-being in general.  
Thus the practice of peppering the roadside with strident signage commercializes the natural 
environment.   An especially egregious form of visual pollution consists in co-opting a scenic 
view by installing giant billboards in the center of a prime vista in the countryside.  Urban 
landscapes exhibit similar forms of appropriating public visual space.  Similarly, the design of 
built environments should be guided not primarily by economy or traffic control in the 
interests of efficiency but by its contribution to promoting and enhancing safety and well-
being.  Such a general principle needs to be implemented with sensitive regard to specific 
conditions, and it is a valuable standard against which to judge the commercial appropriation 
 
 
(i.e., co-optation) of public space.  In fact, it is a useful measure of any proposal for the 
planning, design, and construction of districts and buildings, streets and highways, parks and 
gardens, towns and cities. 
It is clear that fulfilling perceptual needs is at the same time both an aesthetic and a 
moral demand.  These needs take precedence over human institutions:  economic, social, and 
political.  Indeed, they should more properly determine them.  The father who steals a loaf of 
bread to feed his starving children is exercising a moral-aesthetic claim that supersedes any 
social construction.  There are other ways of justifying such claims as these and they are often 
expressed in political slogans such as “Human rights over property rights!” and in calls for 
radical economic and social change.  It is well to be clear about the aesthetic-moral grounds 
for these efforts and not try to justify them by a cognitive system that fails to recognize they 
rest on basic perceptual claims. 
Appealing to perceptual experience exposes an insidious practice endemic in consumer 
culture.  Perception is, rightly, the experience of humans and, as we earlier observed, it is 
never pure but is unavoidably shaped by all the conditions that give content and meaning to 
human experience.  Many of these influences on perception are circumstantial and largely 
unselected:  language, education, custom, and other social conditions.  Some practices are 
designed for the purpose of gaining influence and control.  Thus when people make 
perceptual choices, they may not be at all “free” but instead are often externally influenced 
and even directed.  And it is in such cases that we confront another juxtaposition of the 
aesthetic with the moral.  The appeal to “free choice” or “personal taste” overlooks the crass 
fact that choices are never wholly free nor are determinations of taste simply personal.  Just as 
political propaganda is a powerful means for inciting political action, commercial propaganda, 
 
 
which we customarily euphemize as “advertising,” is quite as powerful, perhaps even more so 
because, by being so pervasive, it is largely unnoticed yet all the more influential.   
While political force is exercised by legal and judicial means, commercial force must 
use more subtle mechanisms to lead people to act willingly for the purposes and in the 
interests of the market.  The motive of advertising is to excite desire in people and turn them 
into consumers.  In fact, in a market-dominated society there are neither people nor citizens 
but only consumers.  The mechanism at work in a market economy is not need but desire, and 
cultural fashions and social movements are appropriated and transformed into instruments for 
social control.  Political interests use this mechanism to gain and exercise political power; 
economic interests use it to influence consumption and enhance profitability.   
A word has come into use that identifies this mechanism of appropriating public 
space, human behavior, simple interests, our very sensibility:  that word is ‘co-optation’.  One 
meaning of co-opt is “to take over or to appropriate.”  Aesthetics may be thought of, most 
generally, as the theory of sensibility.  What, then, is co-opted in the political and economic 
use of aesthetics?  Our very sensibility!  Thus sensibility is formed and guided in the interests 
of control and marketing.  People’s desires and taste are shaped, not to promote health or 
fulfillment, let alone aesthetic interests, but to produce profit or increase power.  This may be 
called “the co-optation of sensibility.”  Because the concern of co-optation with sensibility, it 
becomes a profoundly aesthetic matter; because of its interest in controlling behavior, it is a 
profoundly political matter; because of its effects on human well-being it is a profoundly 
moral matter.  Here the aesthetic and the moral are again indistinguishable: in this context 
they combine inseparably.  
 
 
Thus as the perceptual commons is environmental, it is aesthetic; as it is appropriative, 
it is political; and as it is social, it is moral.  The perceptual origins and elaboration of the 
aesthetic lead it to the political and the moral where it can offer a unique social contribution.  
The aesthetic can then become the ground for what Nietzsche called the revaluation of values.   
Such a recognition of the significance of the aesthetic led Sasaki to note, “What we learned 
from early modern aesthetics is that when basic values become suspect, or even invalid, 
aesthetic judgment is the only path towards the establishment of new values.”21  The aesthetic 
is thus not only a powerful instrument for social criticism:   it has the still greater power to 
transform the human world by supplying its standard of fulfillment.   
Aesthetic experience, then, inevitably spills over into the moral world and both are 
capable of a full normative range.  When perception is positive, it enhances the aesthetic and 
the moral, and when harmful, damages both.  We can, therefore, no longer look at any event 
as exclusively aesthetic, for this only contributes to its isolation.  Similarly, we must free 
ourselves from the myth of aesthetic disinterestedness, a view that rests on a contrived, even 
false ordering of the world.22  It is one thing to identify and distinguish aesthetic value; it is 
                                                          
21  Ibid., § 5. 
22  See Sensibility and Sense:  The Aesthetic Transformation of the Human World, Ch. 5.  I develop an extended critique of the notion 
of aesthetic disinterestedness in A. Berleant, Re-thinking Aesthetics, Rogue Essays on Aesthetics and the Arts (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004), Pt. I. 
17   I have explored the idea of a social aesthetic in a number of places.  See "Aesthetics and Community," Journal of Value 
Inquiry  28, 257-272 (1994), special issue on aesthetics, reprinted in Arnold Berleant, Living in the Landscape:  Toward an Aesthetics 
of Environment (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1997); "On Getting Along Beautifully:  Ideas for a Social Aesthetics," in 
Aesthetics in the Human Environment, ed. Pauline von Bonsdorff and Arto Haapala (Lahti, Finland:  International Institute of 
Applied Aesthetics, 1999), pp. 12-29, reprinted in Aesthetics and Environment, Theme and Variations on Art and Culture. (Aldershot: 
 
 
quite another to separate it from its inherence in the objects, events, and conditions of the 
human world, its larger home. 
What is most forceful in fulfilled experience with the arts is our complete absorption 
in perceptual experience that has temporal depth conjoined with the resonances of memory 
and meaning:  aesthetic engagement.  Yet this account of aesthetic experience in the arts is 
also a description of human relations, both personal and social, at their most fulfilling.  It is a 
description of a social aesthetic, and indeed of the human environment en tout.23  Most fully, it 
represents our best understanding of the world of human experience.  Indeed, in the human 
environment, the moral, the social, and the political are thoroughly interwoven, and their 
implications for an aesthetics of environment provide grounds for critical judgment and 
claims for gratification.  In the aesthetic we discover the human world, and in reconstituting 
the aesthetic, we lay the groundwork for reconstructing a more humane world.  Our world is 
first aesthetic but at the same time moral, and that is why the aesthetic verges on the political 
and where its transformative powers make possible a unique social contribution.   
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